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EDITORIAL NOTES
REVERSAL AND RETRIAL EXCLUSIVELY ON THE Quantum or DAX-
AGES.-In Chafin v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,1 an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for death by wrongful act, the
case Was submitted to the court on demurrer by the defendant to
the plaintiff's evidence. The jury found a conditional verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $19,000. The trial court, over-
ruling a demurrer to the evidence, rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for the full amount of the verdict. The Supreme
Court sustained the judgment of the lower court on the demurrer
to the evidence, but set aside the verdict of the jury on the ground
that the damages were excessive and ordered a new trial re-
stricted to an inquiry of damages.
In most instances wherein objection has heretofore been urged
in the Supreme Court to verdicts as awarding excessive damages,
either the objection has been overruled or reversal has been based
on additional grounds of error, so that no question arose as to the
mode and extent of reversal based solely on objection to the amount
of the damages. But in at least one case2 a new trial in toto was
ordered where no error was found except excess in the damages.
Consequently, it is believed that the principal case marks a new
policy of the court with respect to this particular phase of new
trials.
Under the ancient common-law doctrine, the verdict of a jury
was single and indivisible. It stood or fell as a whole, and conse-
quently a partial new trial was not known in those days.2 Never-
theless, reversal and retrial confined to a part of the issues were
recognized as early as the time of Tidd,4 and the rule in its prac-
tical and general application is by no means a novelty.5 However,
the principle is not without restrictions in its operation. The
granting of a new trial restricted to part of the issues, where
plainly proper, is entirely discretionary with the court and may
in any case be refused 6 A new trial on all the issues will be or-
193 S. E. 822 (W. Va. 1917).
O 0gg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va. 139 (1884). Apparently the question of limiting
the new trial to An inquiry of damages was not raised, and hence the courf was not
required to pass upon it
'Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. B. 102, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 588; see note
in 7 Ann. Cas. 116.
'2 TrIDD, PRAcicE, -2 Am. ed. (1807), 1129.
Simmons v. Fish. supra, and cases cited in note 13, infra.
a Rushing v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. H. 890 (1908).
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dered in every case if such a course is more consonant with justice.r
Always, the issues to be retried separately must be actually separ-
able from the other issues.8 Also, if on a trial below the jury
omit to find a matter which goes to the very point of the issue,
the new trial granted by the Supreme Court must be in toto.1
And the issues always must have been submitted to the jury in the
first instance in the mode required by law.10 Otherwise, withhold-
ing part of the issues from the new trial obviously would be usurp-
ing the functions of the jury. In any event, the court will not
undertake to refine the proceeding beyond reason in order to ap-
ply the rule restricting retrial of the issues, but rather will order
a new trial in toto.1 '
The principal case, although the first in West Virginia wherein
a new trial was limited to an inquiry of damages, is not the first
case in which the general doctrine of limiting issues on a new trial
has been applied and approved.12 There is no question that the
rule adopted by the principal ease is in accord with mod-
ern tendencies and the great weight of authority." In some
7Forter v. Sherman County Banking Co., 40 Neb. 274, 58 N. W. 721 (1894);
Hawk v. Pine Co., 149 N. C. 10, 62 S. E. 752 (1908).
8 Benton v. Collins, 125 N. C. 83, 34 S. B. 242, 47 L. R. A. 33 (1899), quoted
and approved in the principal case.
9 Holmes v. Godwin, 71 N. C. 306 (1873).
1"Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408 (1882).
11 Farrar v. Wheeler, 145 Fed. 482, 489 (1906). Where the jury had included
an improper Item in the verdict, the appellate court would not order a new trial
for the sole purpose of finding the value of the improper item and deducting such
value from the amount of the original verdict.
"2The general doctrine seems to have been approved in West Virginia first in
Moss o. Railroad Co., 75 W. Va. 62, 83 S. B. 721 (1914), where a case was re-
manded for a new trial on the sole issue of appointment and qualification of the
plaintiff as administratrix. The last named case has been followed in Crockett v.
Black Wolf C. & C. Co., 75 W. Va. 325, 83 S. U. 987 (1914), and Brogan v. Traction
Co., 76 W. Va. 698, 86 S. E. 753 (1915). The doctrine had already received ap-
proval in Virginia in Fry v. Stowers, 98 Va. 417, 36 S. E. 482 (1900). In Austin
v. Calloway, 73 W. Va. 231, 80 S. B. 361 (1913), the West Virginia Supreme Court
lost the opportunity of applying the doctrine to the first of its new series of de-
cisions as to pleading appointment and qualification of personal representatives be-
cause the doctrine was not brought to the attention of the court. See conclusion
of opinion in Moss v. Railroad Co., supra.
IClyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 AtI. 539, 42 Am. St. Rep. 194 (1894)
Smith v. Whittlesey, 79 Conn. 189, 63 Atl. 1085, 7 Ann. Cas. 114 (1906) (based
on statute) ; Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. 102, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 588
(1912) ; Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. B. 264, 53 Am.
St. Rep. 511, 30 L. R. A. 257 (1895) ; Marshall v. Dalton Paper Mills, 82 Vt. 489,
74 At. 108, 24 I. R. A. (N. S.) 128 (1909) ; Patterson v. Blakeney, 33 Ala. 338
(1858) ; Powell v. Augusta & S. R. Co., 77 Ga. 192, 3 S. E. 757 (1886); Scott v.
Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 103 Miss. 522, 60 So. 215 (1912) ; Osmers v. Fury, 32 Mont.
581, 81 Pae. 345 (1905) ; Weyand v. Randall, 131 App. Div. 167, 115 N. Y. Supp.
279 (1909) ; Curtis, etc. Co. v. Pigg, 39 Okla. 31, 134 Pac. 1125 (1913) ; Newbal v.
2
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states the rule has been carried into statutory provisions.1"
Only one shadow of doubt as to full acceptance of the general
rule hangs over the decision of the court in the principal case. In
point 8 of the syllabus,"5 the court seems to confine the application
of the doctrine to cases wherein a demurrer to the evidence has
limited the functions of the jury to an inquiry of damages, leaving
the other issues to be disposed of by the court. Although a demur-
rer to the evidence brings about a situation ideal for application
of the rule, such a limitation is not sanctioned by any of the au-
thorities and would not seem to be based on reason. The true rule
is concerned, not with the question whether the issues have in fact
been severed, e. g., by a demurrer to the evidence, but with the
question whether the issues are potentially capable of severance."
It is believed, however, that the court so framed the syllabus as it
appears in the principal-ease in order to make it conform strictly
to the facts of the case, and not for the purpose of limiting the ap-
plication of the rule, intending to leave further expansion of the
doctrine to cases as they shall arise upon their own peculiar state
of facts. Hence, it is submitted that, when the occasion shall de-
mand, the principle will be applied with equal force to a verdict
covering all the issues where there is error alone as to the quantiom
of the damages.
An interesting question additional to the main topic is suggested
by the circumstances of the principal case. Could the Supreme
Court have gone farther even than it did in sustaining the ver-
dict ? In other words, since excessive damages constituted the only
Egan, 28 R. 1. 584, 68 At!. 471 (1908); Braunsdorf v. Fellner, 76 Wis. 1, 45 N.
W. 97 (1890) (based on statute).
U4 Connecticut Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode
Island, Wisconsin, and the Federal Courts are mentioned in Smith v. Whittlesley,
supra, and in the note to the latter case in 7 Ann. Cas. 116, as jurisdictions where
such statutes prevail. No doubt other states have enacted statutes since the note in
7 Ann. Cas. 116 was written. However, an examination of the above authorities
will show that the rule Is widely prevalent independently of statutes, and In many
jurisdictions was established In advance of the statutes.
'5Point 8 reads as follows: "In an action for personal injuries, where there is
a demurrer to the evidence by the defendant, and there is no error in the trial in
so far as it determines the liability of the defendant, but there is error In ascer-
taining the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled In the action, the
two Issues. are distinct and separable, and a new trial may be granted, limited to as-
certaining the proper amount of damages, and, when so ascertained, judgment thereon
for the plaintiff may be entered." No such limitation of the rule to cases where
there Is a demurrer to the evidence is hinted at In the opinion. There was no de-
murrer to the evidence in Moss v. Railroad Co.. supra, wherein the general prin-
ciple was first adopted.
IsAll tho cages cited in note 13, supra, show this to be the true distinction. In
particular, see Moss v. Railroad Co., supra.
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error in the verdict, could the court have remanded the case with
an option to the plaintiff to remit a stated portion of the damages,
or, i lieu thereof, to submit to a new trial confined to the quantum
of the damages?
A full consideration of the latter question would involve a col-
lateral inquiry into the subject of remitting an excess of recovery,
which is rather beyond the scope of this discussion. However, the
general proposition that a remittitur may be allowed in proper
cases upon a remanding order from the Supreme Court has been
established by ample authority. 7 In a proper ease, the appellate
court will even enter a revised judgment for the proper amount
without any remanding to the lower court for'further proceedings
in that behalf."' The true criterion seems to be whether there are
any data before the court by which the proper amount may be
accurately ascertained without usurping the functions of the
jury."5 Such data, of necessity, must almost always be lacking in
actions sounding in damages where there is a conflict in.the evi-
dence, and hence particularly in tort actions. In the principal
ease, however, there seems to be no conflict in the evidence except
upon the issue of liability, and that issue was disposed of separ-
ately upon the demurrer to the evidence. Extent and permanency
of the injury, pain and mental anguish, all of which usually bear
upon the quantum of the damage.s in personal injury cases, are
here absent; for this was a case of instant death. There was noth-
ing left to affect the measure of the damages except the undisputed
elements of earning capacity of the deceased and the respective
life expectancies involved. These elements were so definite that
the appellate court seemingly was able to calculate the precise
amount of the verdict ($15,695.63) which the jury might properly
have found. It should be noted, however, that the- court, for the
basis of its calculation, gives the plaintiff the full benefit of all as-
17 Tennant's Executor v. Gray, 5 Munf. 494 (Va. 1817) ; Gibson v. The Governor,
11 Leigh 600 (Va. 1841). It will be noted, however, that the two cases cited above
were actions of debt on bonds, and hence in each case there was documentary evi-
dence to aid in estimating the proper recovery. On the other hand, see Hook v.
Turnbull, 6 Call 85 (Va. 1806), an action on the case for slander, where the ver-
dict was for $1000 and the damages laid in the writ were only $500 and, although
the case was remanded for a new trial without condition, the court says that the plain-
tiff would have been entitled to a remittitul' if he bad exercised his right in the
lower court. Note 'that the right was not denied on the ground that the recovery
grew out of unliquidated damages.
IsBowyer v. Hewitt, 2 Gratt. 193 (Va. 1845).
MI Unfrled v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 34 W. Va. 260, 12 S. B. 512 (1890) ; Vinal v.
Core, IS W. Va. 1, 59-62 (1881).
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suption 0s,2' and thereby arrives at a maximum possible recovery
of $15,695.63. While these assumptions are not at all strained
or improbable, still they were not conclusive presumptions.
Hence, the jury was not bound to have given them their full face
value and it is impossible to say that they were given full weight
in arriving at the verdict. Although the jury could have found
$15,695.63 as actually based on the evidence, adding the residue of
the $19,000 by reason of passion, prejudice or some other motive,
there is no way of determining that they actually did so. If it
could be determined that they actually so reached a verdict, a re-
mittitur could be allowed which, instead of superseding the ver-
dict would really be based on the verdict. On the other hand, if,
by discounting assumptions in favor of the plaintiff, as they might
and may have done, the jury determined that the plaintiff was
entitled on the evidence to recover only $15,000 and added the
extra $4000 on account of passion or prejudice, then to allow a
rernittitur reducing the recovery to the sum of $15,695.63 would
be nothing more nor less than substituting the judgment of the
court for the verdict of the jury. Although the principal case
offers about as plain a case as can be offered for remittitur of
damages in an action ex delicto. the court certainly acted within
its proper discretion in ordering a new trial on the damages. To
have allowed a remittitur might have resulted in injustice. It is
interesting to note, however, that a remittitur has been allowed
in a ease under precisely similar circumstances.2' The principal
case is of chief interest as a further expansion of the salutary rule
recently adopted of limiting issues upon new trials.
-L. C.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 0F CONTRACT TO REIEASE INCHOATE
RIGHT OF DowER.-In the case of Grookstanks v. Ransbargere
2 That deceased's earning capacity would have continued undiminished during
his entire expectancy of life; and that he would have shared his earnings equally
during all that time with his wife and his child.
2L McKay u. New Eng. Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454, 43 Ati. 29 (1899). This was an
action for death by wrongful act. The verdict was held excessive. The appellate
court calculated the proper amount, basing its calculation upon the life expectan-
cies of deceased's parents and his earning capacity. It was ordered that plaintiff
might accept the reduced amount resulting from the court's calculation by way of
remittitur, or else submit to a new trial.
192 S. B. 78 (W. Va. 1917).
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